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Abstract 
In this paper I outline recent policy reforms to the General Medical Council and 
how these are designed to promote greater public confidence in its management of 
the patient complaint and fitness to practise tribunal process. I explore how in 
spite of a decade of reform, potential for bias remains in relation to how issues of 
race and ethnicity, disability, age, class, gender and English language proficiency, 
intersect with complaint making and case progression. I draw on reviews of and 
data from the General Medical Council to examine the key issues surrounding the 
representativeness of the medical tribunal process, in terms of members age, 
gender and race and ethnicity. I note that, as in other high-income countries, 
there is a tendency within the UK for the risk-focused regulatory system to focus 
its reforming agenda on the more effective performance management of cost and 
risk, rather than on inculcating a more diverse patient presence and biographical 
profile within the day-to-day operation of regulatory regimes. I argue that this 
might unintentionally lead to the promotion of an optimism bias within risk-
focused regulatory systems, potentially leading to a failure to communicate 
realistic perceptions of medical risk to patients and their families, and in doing so 
perhaps serving to further exacerbate the situation when instances of medical 
error and negligence occur. I conclude that current regulatory reforms in the UK 
are unlikely as a result to as fully promote the public interest and patient safety as 
they intend.  
Key words: risk, risk regulation, medical profession, optimism bias, General 
Medical Council 
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Introduction 
Within medical regulation literature internationally, there is now wide recognition 
that efforts to improve patient safety are partly contingent on the establishment 
of effective and appropriate mechanisms for responding to complaints from 
members of the public about the doctors who treat them (Beaupert et al 2014). 
Equally, however, it is acknowledged that public understanding and awareness of 
the processes in place to protect them from unsafe or poorly-performing doctors is 
all too often highly limited, and for those unfortunate enough to require recourse 
to them, fraught with uncertainty and the potential for emotional trauma (Reader 
et al 2014). The United Kingdom (UK) is no different in this regard (Ehrich 2006).  
In 2013 the UK government published the report of the Francis inquiry into serious 
failings in care at Mid-Staffordshire National Health Service (NHS) Foundation 
Trust. The Francis inquiry was concerned with 1,200 preventable deaths which 
occurred over a three year period at the Trust’s hospital. In its findings, the report 
of the inquiry noted that although patient complaints had identified problems of 
neglect and poor care at the trust, deficiencies in complaint handling resulted in 
critical warning signs being missed (Francis 2013). Furthermore, the report 
described a culture of fear, secrecy and defensiveness in which whistle-blowers 
were silenced and relatives ignored (Simpson and Morris 2014).   
The Francis report is the latest in a long-line of high profile medical scandals in the 
UK over the last two decades, which includes Bristol Royal Infirmary in 1997, Alder 
Hey Children’s Hospital in 1999, and more lately, Morecombe Bay NHS Foundation 
Trust in 2015 (Dyer 2015). All of which have highlighted concerns surrounding the 
ability and willingness of NHS systems and medical leaders, to identify and 
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satisfactorily deal with underperformance and medical mistakes. The proposed 
creation of a statutory duty of candour to ensure openness and transparency 
amongst NHS staff through establishing a legal obligation to report treatment or 
care they believe has caused death or serious injury, is the latest governmental 
attempt to address this issue (GMC 2015a). 
In this article I examine recent reforms to the General Medical Council (GMC) 
which have been implemented to improve how it responds to complaints and 
instigates disciplinary proceedings against doctors via a fitness to practise panel 
(GMC 2013a). These changes are designed to address the criticism that rather than 
pursing its statutory duty to secure the public interest, its processes have first and 
foremost acted to protect doctors (Brazier and Ost 2013). In addition to NHS 
complaint procedures operating at a local level in hospitals and general practice 
surgeries, a number of national-level bodies respond to complaints against medical 
practitioners (Clwyd and Hart 2013). The National Clinical Assessment Service, the 
Care Quality Commission, as well as the Parliamentary and Health Service 
Ombudsman, are all important points of contact for responding to patient 
complaints (Chamberlain 2015). However, the General Medical Council, that 
operates using powers provided legislation (the Medical Act 1983), is the only body 
with the authority to remove a doctor from the medical register of approved 
practitioners and as a result, prevent them from practising medicine in the UK. 
The General Medical Council remains the principal formal legal mechanism for 
medical regulation and responding to complaints about the fitness to practise of 
doctors (Williams et al 2014). As a consequence, any changes made to the General 
Medical Council, possess the potential to promote far reaching change in the 
patient experience of complaining about a doctor (Gallagher and Mazor 2015). But 
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before exploring this further, it is necessary to first situate my analysis of the 
current system within current academic debate surrounding the emergence of risk-
based regulation within the medical and healthcare sphere, in order to highlight its 
contribution to this literature.  
Risk-based medical regulation 
The regulation of medical work in the UK has undergone a period of far reaching 
reform over the last decade as a result of external pressures broadly similar to 
those noted internationally in the US, European, Chinese, Indian and Australasian 
contexts (Bismark et al 2015, Pan et al 2015, Saks 2015, Toth 2015 and Walton-
Roberts 2015). Against the background of the fluxing conditions of the post-
recession global political-economy, a growing tension between rising running costs 
and the advocacy of greater patient choice and rights of access, has led to state 
intervention to promote non-medical involvement in the delivery of health care 
services and their quality assurance (Giarelli, et al 2014 Brown et al 2015). 
Although significant national variation exists in how this state of affairs both 
presents itself and plays out, the key result, particularly in the US and Europe, has 
been an intensification and expansion of managerial discourses and practices 
shaping the activity of the health care system and monitoring the performance of 
medical work (de Vries  et al 2009, Risso-Gill 2014).  
Healthcare managerialism utilises a mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms of  
administrative bureaucratic power which operate on institutional structures and 
human subjectivities via performance monitoring and appraisal mechanisms - such 
as standard and target setting, audit and appraisal - while simultaneous seeking to 
retain the appearance of devolved discretion and control over decision making 
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processes at a local level, primarily due to the highly specialised nature of 
professional forms of expertise (Courpasson 2000, Sheaff et al 2003, Checkland et 
al 2007, Checkland and Harrison 2010, Exworthy 2015). In this article, I argue that 
such managerial discourses have proliferated throughout the health and social care 
sphere in the UK in the last two decades, and have become increasingly inculcated 
within professional regulatory systems, as the state has acted legislatively under a 
modernising agenda to minimise costs and risks by supporting greater managerial 
involvement in the governance of public services (Baldwin 2004, Saks 2014).  
Hood and Millier (2010:1) argue that we live in ‘the age of risk-based regulation’. 
This is marked by professional self-regulation - where elite groups within a 
profession possess control over the regulatory institutions that set and maintain 
training, practice and disciplinary standards - giving way to regulated self-
regulation - where the state legislates to subject the activity of professional 
groups and their regulatory institutions to independent oversight (Chamberlain 
2015). For example, in the UK, the Medical Act 1858 established de facto medical 
control over the General Medical Council as its board members were primarily 
drawn from representatives of institutions controlled by doctors, medical schools 
and the royal colleges, supplemented by a small number of elected members 
drawn from the rank and file of the profession. Yet the Health and Social Care Act 
2008 not only required equal non-medical lay involvement in the running of the 
General Medical Council, it also subjected it to independent scrutiny via the 
Professional Standards Authority. This body reports directly to parliament and is 
tasked with reviewing decisions made by UK regulators about practitioners’ fitness 
to practise. Importantly, it possesses the power to appeal decisions to the High 
Court (Court of Session in Scotland) if it considers them to be insufficient for the 
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protection of the public  This approach allows the state to subject the operation of 
the General Medical Council to risk-based managerial performance imperatives, 
such as institutional audit and target-driven outcome-based performance 
appraisal, while also allowing it to retain a necessary degree of discretion over 
professional decision-making in relation to the training and discipline of rank and 
file members.  
A key outcome, therefore, of this shift toward regulated self-regulation for the UK 
medical profession has been that doctors and their professional institutions now 
possess a much more externally managed and risk-adverse form of professional 
autonomy than has historically been the case (Saks 2015). Certainly, over the last 
three decades the day-to-day practices of doctors have become increasingly 
subject to surveillance and risk-management by NHS management, the General 
Medical Council and elite professional medical bodies, most notably the royal 
colleges. The introduction of medical revalidation by the Health and Social Care 
Act 2008 is the latest example of this trend (Dent et al 2016). Revalidation 
requires the periodic (every five years) recertification of a doctor’s fitness to 
practise, in order for them to remain on the medical register and practice 
medicine in the UK. The logistics involved in ensuring that all medical practitioners 
are revalidated has meant that its introduction nationally has taken several years 
and indeed, it was not fully rolled out until 2016.   
The implementation of revalidation is indicative of a regulatory process undergoing 
a transformative period of reform from being a reactive, incident-led regime 
preoccupied with ensuring medical privilege, to a proactive risk-adverse overseer 
of professional standards designed to secure public safety (Waring and Dixon-
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Woods 2010). However, whatever the value of revalidation as a tool for supporting 
regulatory reform towards forms of regulated self-regulation which are focused on 
ensuring public safety through a risk-focused lens, there undoubtedly has been a 
perceptible increase within the medical profession of the view that the primary 
purpose of the new regulatory regime is to be more discipline-oriented and 
punitive (Brennan 2014). Researchers have found that not only do rank-and-file 
doctors tend to have a cynical attitude about the substantive capacity of 
revalidation to identify underperforming doctors, but also, for many its 
introduction symbolises a discernible orientation towards more publicly ‘naming 
and shaming’ individual doctors, even when doubt exits over the cause of a clinical 
error (Bridges et al 2014, Entwistle and Matthews 2015). I will explore this issue in 
more detail in the next section when I discuss the impact of reforms to the 
complaint and medical tribunal process.  
Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter (2008) suggest that risk-based regulation is an elusive 
and slippery term, which is perhaps best conceived ‘as a cluster of tools and 
characteristics rather than a clearly defined and coherent method’ (2008:70). Day 
et al (2016) echo these sentiments in their pilot study of the growing role of risk 
management tools in the domain of applied health research. Revalidation, with its 
focus on the anticipation and manageability of risk via periodic performance 
appraisal focused on individual competence, is one example of such a tool 
(Chamberlain 2015). In this article I explore another risk-focused regulatory tool 
which has not been paid as much attention as revalidation: the patient complaint 
and tribunal process. There has been a tendency within the academic literature to 
focus conceptually and empirically on exploring the impact of regulatory reforms 
in medicine by examining the introduction of managerialist tools designed to 
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support risk-identification and analysis methods, such as medical audit or 
contractual annual appraisal, for example (see Dent et al 2016). Yet the complaint 
and tribunal process must also be examined if we are to obtain as rounded a 
picture as possible of the impact of contemporary regulatory reforms on both the 
medical profession and the public experience of health care delivery (Chamberlain 
2012).   
By focusing on the complaint and tribunal process, I aim to supplement and extend 
the existing academic corpus concerned with contemporary developments in the 
professions and shift towards risk-based regulation in the medical and healthcare 
spheres. In particular, I critically investigate an important feature of contemporary 
developments in the modernisation of medical regulation. Namely that, in pushing 
through regulatory reform, the UK state rhetorically advocates greater public 
involvement in healthcare governance and medical regulatory processes. But in 
reality, as Dent et al (2016) note, calls for greater non-medical involvement in 
healthcare and medical regulation, no matter how well intentioned, have all too 
often ended up as being a tokenistic smokescreen for greater administrative and 
managerial control, rather than being a progressive platform for promoting closer 
public/professional co-operation and collaborative partnership. 
Hence, by focusing on the diversity of patient involvement within the complaint 
and tribunal process, I aim to  place under the microscope a hitherto relatively 
under-examined problem space from which pertinent questions and new areas for 
investigation may emerge, which furthermore, serve to challenge the entrenched 
medical and managerial interests that surround the contemporary regulation of 
doctors (Short 2015).  For example, it may well be that only by promoting greater 
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diversity in user participation in regulatory processes, with the goal of embedding 
within health care managerial and professional systems a working culture which 
prioritises the patient experience and need, rather than cost minimisation and 
mutual protectionism, that the possible negative excesses of risk-based regulatory 
approaches can be more fully accounted for and the public interest protected. 
I have two main objectives in this article.  Firstly, to contribute to current 
academic discourses surrounding the shift toward risk-based models of professional 
regulation in the United Kingdom (UK), and secondly, to do so by outlining reforms 
in the UK complaint and medical tribunal process. To achieve these objectives I 
bring together empirical data from a variety of already published official and 
academic sources concerning the patient and practitioner experience of the 
complaint and medical tribunal process. I supplement this with empirical data 
obtained from the General Medical Council, through a freedom of information 
request, regarding the make-up of the medical tribunal panel members in terms of 
their gender, age and race and ethnicity.  
This is an emerging area of research as it is only in the last decade that it has been 
possible for non-medical members to gain the necessary access to the previously 
closed-shop regulatory ‘medical club’ needed to develop a more conceptually fine-
grained critical analysis of this aspect of the practice of medicine in the UK 
(Chamberlain 2015). Thus, in this article I use a mixture of sources to develop my 
analysis. However, I see this article as developing arguments and key points that 
will require further empirical validation, and furthermore, that this will only be 
achievable through sustained independent investigation of the operation of the 
medical tribunal process over time. Indeed, it may well be another decade (or 
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more) before the impact of the emergence of risk-based approaches in the field of 
medical regulation is fully knowable, particularly given that medical revalidation 
was not fully implemented in the UK until 2016, and that reforms to the medical 
complaint and tribunal process are currently ongoing. 
Nonetheless, I will show in this article that the existing data does indicate 
important limitations of the current governmental-driven regulatory reform focus 
on more effective cost and risk management within healthcare. In particular, that 
there has been a failure to broaden the diversity of public involvement in 
regulatory processes, and as such an element of cautionary doubt must remain 
over their ability to secure the public interest.  
 
Complaints and medical tribunal reform: A more punishment-focused regime?  
The salience of media driven narratives in contemporary society, which 
substantively shape and inform public opinion, as well as serve to further politicise 
health care reforming agendas, means that there is an ever present need for 
publicly accountable bodies, such as the General Medical Council, to demonstrate 
institutional effectiveness in the face of growing independent evaluation of their 
activities (Baldwin 2004). As a result, perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a growing 
perception within the medical profession that the General Medical Council has 
become far less tolerant of infractions (Bridges et al 2014).  
Therefore, it is interesting to consider whether the General Medical Council has, in 
reality, become a more punitive institution.  It is certainly the case that legislative 
changes have been made to the case management and pre-tribunal process to 
allow the General Medical Council to be more proactive in managing caseloads via 
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interim order panels, which restrict a doctor's practice while allegations about 
their conduct are being resolved (MPTS 2015). At the same time, there has been a 
move to separate the General Medical Council’s investigatory and adjudicatory 
functions in order to secure greater institutional transparency and allay concerns 
that its complaint system is biased toward doctors. Finally, and related to this 
latter point, the level of proof required to secure a tribunal conviction has been 
reduced. Traditionally, the evidentiary burden to be met was that of the criminal 
standard of proof – beyond reasonable doubt – it is now the lower civil standard of 
proof- on the balance of probabilities (Quirk 2013). This reform was justified on 
the grounds that historically the General Medical Council had often been unable to 
remove a doctor from the medical register, even when doubt existed over their 
clinical performance, because the standard of proof required was unduly high, and 
this has impacted significantly upon the number of successful prosecutions 
(William et al 2015).  
There has been much criticism within the profession regarding the reduction in the 
standard of proof required to secure a fitness to practise conviction and strike a 
doctor off the medical register, with many viewing it as signifying that the General 
Medical Council is adopting a more punitive stance towards doctors when it 
receives complaints (Chamberlain 2015). Evidence exists to suggest that the 
General Medical Council  is more proactively seeking to restrict a doctor’s 
practice, in addition to issuing more warnings and providing individual doctors (and 
their employers) with informal advice and guidance, with this trebling from little 
over 400 in 2010 to over 1,200 in 2015 (Gallagher and Foster 2015). There is also a 
developing body of research to indicate that pre-hearing investigative measures 
are traumatising for doctors who suffer from health-related problems in particular, 
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and in some instances this is leading them to agree to high impact sanctions, 
namely suspension or erasure from the medical register, before they attend a 
tribunal hearing, with the hearing subsequently becoming a ‘rubber stamp’ 
exercise (Horsfall 2015).  
This in itself raises profound concerns over the procedural fairness of the changes 
made to the General Medical Council processes. Researchers reporting on the 
experiences of nearly 8,000 doctors found that those who had recently been the 
subject of a complaint were twice as likely as other doctors to report moderate or 
severe anxiety, and twice as likely to have thoughts of self-harm (see Bourne 
2015). Further evidence suggests that doctors referred to the General Medical 
Council have especially high rates of psychological illness, with 26% reporting 
moderate to severe depression and 22% cent reporting moderate to severe anxiety 
(Moberly 2014). Moreover, since 2004 96 doctors have died while facing a fitness to 
practise investigation, which suggests that there are legitimate reasons to be 
seriously concerned about the nature of the institutional transformation underway 
(Chamberlain 2015). 
Protecting patients first and foremost? 
As the preceding section outlined, a growing body of practitioner-focused research 
evidence exists to suggest that the General Medical Council is indeed changing and 
taking a more robust stance toward complaints. However, while recognising that 
the evidence discussed so far is indicative that changes introduced by the Health 
and Social Care Act 2008 are indeed transforming the General Medical Council, it is 
equally important to highlight that significant countervailing evidence exists to 
suggest that the impact of this transformation on the public experience of the 
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complaint system appears to have been negligible. The latest General Medical 
Council figures show that in 2014 it received 9,624 complaints, yet 7,180 (75%) 
were not subject to formal investigation, and of the 2,444 investigated, only 228 
(10%) were later subject to a tribunal hearing, resulting in only 71 doctors (3%) 
having their names removed from the medical register (GMC 2015e). This seems a 
rather small proportion, even when it is acknowledged that not all complaints 
received by the General Medical Council fall within its remit. The number of 
complaints has increased over time from 1,003 in 1995 to 9,624 in 2014 but the 
numbers reaching the tribunal stage and subsequently being stuck off has 
remained small throughout this period. For example, 71 doctors were removed  
from the medical register in 2014, compared to 56 in 2001 (Archer 2014).  
Williams et al in their review of the General Medical Council published by Institute 
for the Study of Civil Society noted that there had been an increase in the level of 
complaints about doctors: in 1992 less than 1% of the doctors on the register were 
the subject of complaints, in 2012 this had risen to 4% (Williams et al 2014).  
However, in spite of an increase in the number of complaints, the proportion taken 
forward for formal investigation each year remained relatively static at between 
75% and 80%. Furthermore, although analysis of General Medical Council activity 
has shown that it is investigating a greater proportion of doctors, issuing more 
warnings and requiring a larger number of doctors to undertake rehabilitative 
forms of action (such as undertaking clinical skills training), and in spite of what 
the majority of practitioners may believe, the lowering of the standard of 
evidence required to remove a practitioner from the medical register has not 
resulted in a significant rise in the number of doctors being struck off. Research by 
Chamberlain (2015) shows that since the level of evidence required to remove a 
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doctor from the medical register was lowered in 2006 the number of doctors being 
struck off has increased slightly, but this has not been statistically significant 
(from 57 in 2006 to 71 in 2014).  
These figures suggest that the role of the General Medical Council in investigating 
complaints and (when necessary) acting to remove a doctor from the medical 
register, remains heavily problematic. Cause for concern remains over just how it 
decides which complaints it should investigate, as well as within this, the role 
played in its decision-making processes of finite financial and workforce resources. 
This is a particularly pertinent point given that the General Medical Council is self-
funded via an annual subscription fee that all doctors on the medical register must 
pay. Indeed, the little independent research which exists into the General Medical 
Council management of complaints reveals the apparent presence of judgmental 
bias in favour of protecting doctors (Smith 2005, McGivern and Fischer 2010) 
alongside persistently high levels of patient dissatisfaction with the complaint 
process (Williams et al 2014). Worryingly, small-scale independent reviews of a 
sample of General Medical Council complaints have found that articulate 
individuals who present their complaints clearly and in detail are more likely to 
have their cases taken up (Allen 2000, Hughes 2007, Chamberlain 2012). 
Furthermore, the General Medical Council has been criticised on the basis that it 
has not routinely collected data on how issues of race and ethnicity, disability, 
age, class, gender and English language proficiency, intersect with complaint 
making and case progression (Archer et al 2015). 
In reflecting upon these developments, it is possible to conclude that although the 
General Medical Council is undergoing a period of transformation, significant 
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evidence exists to raise doubt about its ability to prioritise the public interest. The 
presence of a possible operational bias towards more articulate complainants, 
along with an apparently limited organisational understanding of the diverse 
nature of complainants’ biographical profiles and needs, becomes an even more 
pressing matter for concern when plans for the future development of tribunal 
hearings are considered. Particularly as at their core sits the issue of how best to 
organise the investigatory and adjudicatory functions of the complaint process. 
 
The Law Commission review and the future of the Medical Practitioner Tribunal 
Service  
Between 1858 and 2008 the General Medical Council was responsible for both 
setting the standards governing the practice of medicine in the UK as well as 
investigating complaints and punishing doctors when infractions occurred (Saks 
2015). It is difficult to erase 150 years of tradition overnight. However, the fact 
that General Medical Council remains responsible for both the investigation and 
the adjudication of allegations of impaired fitness to practice remained a highly 
contentious issue. Although not directly concerned with the General Medical 
Council, the Francis report raised questions over the nature of complaint processes 
within the NHS more generally (Abbasi 2013). For example it has been observed  
that over half the doctors involved in the Mid-Staffordshire scandal faced no action 
from the General Medical Council raising questions over whether the complaint 
and tribunal hearing process as it currently stands can retain the confidence of the 
public and profession (Dyer 2013).  
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It was no coincidence that at this time the Law Commission (which is an 
independent body set up by Parliament to review and recommend reform of the 
law in England and Wales) began a two-year consultation exercise in 2012 to 
establish areas for further regulatory reform, particularly in relation to the 
General Medical Council role (Law Commission 2014a, Law Commission 2014b, Law 
Commission 2014c). At the same time, the General Medical Council acted 
preemptively to reform its internal organisation to enhance the ways in which it 
undertook its legal duties. In doing so it established the Medical Practitioner 
Tribunal Service to assume responsibility for the adjudication of fitness to practice 
cases from June 2012 onwards (GMC 2011). The intention behind the introduction 
of the Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service acting as an autonomous body within 
the organisational structure of the General Medical Council was to provide a 
workable solution to the potential conflict of interest and regulatory problem 
resulting from a single body being responsible for both investigating and judging 
allegations of impaired fitness to practise (Williams et al 2014).   
The creation of a quasi-independent Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service was seen  
by the General Medical Council, NHS management and the medical royal colleges 
to be a cost-effective solution which allowed for the fact that the highly 
specialised nature of modern medical expertise means peer review remains a vital 
quality control mechanism (GMC 2013a, Department of Health 2015). The Law 
Commission review was equally pragmatic in this regard.  However, it did suggest 
greater separation between the Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service and the 
General Medical Council, albeit while still retaining them as a conjoined single 
legal entity. It also argued that the General Medical Council and its investigatory 
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arm should have the right to appeal against a judgement made by the Medical 
Practitioner Tribunal Service, noting that:  
The General Medical Council’s proposed right of appeal is both a 
consequence of, and reinforces, the independence of the new 
Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (Law Commission 2014a: 12). 
In March 2015 parliament approved this recommendation, which came into force 
on the 1st January 2016. Both the Professional Standards Authority (the statutory 
body responsible for regulating the General Medical Council) and the General 
Medical Council now possess the power to appeal to the High Court to obtain a 
judicial review of a Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service decision. Thus, there is 
now a ‘double layer’ of regulatory oversight to tribunal hearing outcomes. A state 
of affairs which arguably reflects the emphasis placed by risk-averse regulatory 
models on minimising the possibility of harm (Chamberlain 2015). 
Yet it is important to note that although the Professional Standards Authority 
already reviews all tribunal decisions, this has not as yet resulted in any changes in 
judgement about competence to practice. Between  2005 to 2013 the Professional 
Standards Authority asked the High Court to reconsider some 15 judgements but in 
all but 2 cases the Tribunal’s initial judgement was upheld (Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence 2005, Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence 2006, 
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence 2007, Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence 2008, Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence 2009, 
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence 2010, Council for Healthcare 
Regulatory Excellence 2011, Professional Standards Authority 2013, Professional 
Standards Authority 2014). This small number of referrals might suggest an 
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increasingly rigorous stance on behalf of the General Medical Council towards 
fitness to practise cases, at least since it became subject to regulatory oversight 
by the Professional Standards Authority. However, it could also reinforce doubts 
which exist in some quarters about the ability of Professional Standards Authority 
risk-based audit processes to secure the public interest given the problems with 
the complaint and medical tribunal process previously outlined in this article and 
elsewhere  (for example, see Wakeford 2015).  
For some observers, it is not clear why giving the General Medical Council the 
power to appeal against the decisions of the Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service 
should result in a major change in the current system and its outcomes. It is also 
not clear why the interested parties resist the creation of a fully independent and 
free standing entity to judge fitness to practice cases. Such an independent entity, 
with specialist input from health non-government organisations and patient-
interest groups alongside professional medical and legal bodies, might well be 
better suited to the task (Clwyd and Hart 2013). Indeed, as Gallagher and Mazor 
(2015) note, the current solution arguably fails to address current patient 
dissatisfaction with the General Medical Council, and indeed the NHS complaint 
systems in general. Such dissatisfaction reflects important changes in the health 
care environment, including the decline of deference towards doctors and the 
greater visibility of regulators (Archer 2014). This trend, as Alaszewski and Brown 
(2007) discuss, has been proactively supported by the UK news media, which over 
the last two decades has sought to advance discussion and action for further 
regulatory reform in light of repeated high profile medical negligence cases.  
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Diversity matters 
Time and time again, research has shown that reforms of the General Medical 
Council and the system of investigating and judging fitness to practice has failed to 
acknowledge and respond to the diverse nature of complainants’ backgrounds and 
needs (for example, see Allen 2000, Hughes 2007, Chamberlain 2012). 
Furthermore, a  key criticism of the current regulatory reform agenda is that when 
the patient experience and voice is included, it tends to centre on what the 
eminent medical sociologist and former independent General Medical Council 
member, Margret Stacey, referred to as an elitist ‘the great and good’ conception 
of public involvement in medical regulation (Stacey 2000). Stacey noted that for 
most of the twentieth century the role of the public in regulatory processes, which 
is designed to act as a balance to professional and managerial interests, has been 
restricted to white male middle-class citizens from largely professional 
occupations, such as academia, law, the senior civil service and the police. The 
danger, Stacey argued, is that as a consequence, even when underpinned by good 
intentions, regulatory reforms run the risk of serving to further reinforce just how 
out of touch medical and socio-political elites can be with the increasingly diverse 
needs of the societies they profess to serve (Stacey 2000). A point echoed by other 
contemporary regulatory commentators (for example, see Archer 2014 and 
Chamberlain 2015). 
Since Stacey’s commentary on General Medical Council membership, there have 
been some important changes, especially in the lay membership of the Medical 
Practitioner Tribunal Service panel.  In my analysis of data provided by the General 
Medical Council in response to a Freedom of Information request, I found that In 
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terms of gender and ethnicity the composition lay membership of the panel tended 
to reflect that of the general population, for example 46% of the 125 lay panelist 
are women (compared to 47% in general working age population) and 17% defined 
themselves as coming from ethnic minority backgrounds (compared to 14% in the 
general population) (ONS 2014). However, I found that in other respects, especially 
socio-economic status and age, panelist did not reflect the general population. 99% 
of the panelists possessed a higher education qualification (compared to 34% of 
working age population); 98% came from middle to upper class occupational groups 
(compared to 25% of the working age population); and 99% came from managerial, 
senior public official or professional occupational backgrounds (compared to 25% of 
working age population) (ONS 2014). Their occupation backgrounds included the 
law (solicitor, barrister, magistrate, 26%); senior public service occupations (24%); 
health (19%); education (15%); business management (14%). Finally, the panelists 
also tended to be older than the general working population with an average age 
of 55 (compared to 40) (ONS 2014). 
Thus, panelists are drawn from a relatively narrow section of the UK population 
(Savage et al 2013). Such an unrepresentativeness of lay ‘representation’ is a 
familiar feature of public-sector regulation in Britain more generally (Gibbs 2015). 
Elliott and Williams (2008) argue this biased representation is a barrier to ensuring 
regulatory regimes are truly representative of the societies whose interests they 
serve. This is certainly a worrying state of affairs given that small-scale research 
into how the GMC handles cases has revealed that individuals from working class 
and ethnic monitory groups appear less likely to get their cases taken forward to 
tribunal(for example, see Allen 2000, Hughes 2007, Council for Health Care 
Regulatory Excellence 2010, Chamberlain 2012). Yet, before we can draw any firm 
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conclusions, I would argue that that at this point in time, when the impact of 
reforms to the UK regulatory field are still unfolding, before any firm conclusions 
can be drawn, we need to first gather empirical evidence, which explores with 
both the public and practitioners, the impact of possible tribunal member bias on 
the patient and doctor experience of the reformed complaint process. To assist in 
this, in the next section of this article, I consider the broader risk implications of 
the current reform agenda for public perceptions concerning regulatory reform and 
patient safety.  
The risk of optimism bias 
In this context of minimalist reform and underrepresentation, I would argue that 
the current regulatory system is vulnerable to and undermined by, ‘optimism bias’ 
(Anderson and Galinsky 2006). The current reforms of medical regulation in the UK 
represent a significant shift from professional self-regulation to regulated self-
regulation using risk-based policy instruments, but as Beaussier and colleagues 
have pointed out these reforms have: 
failed to improve the proportionality, effectiveness, and legitimacy 
of healthcare quality regulation in the NHS (Beaussier et al 2016:1).  
In the new system of medical and health care regulation, risk is no longer solely 
the focus of regulatory control, but rather also the means by which professional 
groupings have become subject to third-party probabilistic surveillance and control 
in order to help legitimise broader societal-level governing regimes (Power 
2007).The introduction of medical revalidation, alongside reforms to the complaint 
and medical tribunal process, epitomise this trend within the medical and health-
care spheres. Every medical practitioner working in the UK is ‘tagged and tracked’, 
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carrying with them every day to work their own personalised ‘risk portfolio’ 
(Chamberlain 2015). These are especially constructed for medical regulatory and 
revalidation purposes and contain within their bindings all the information 
necessary for the reader to formulate a perception about the nature and extent of 
a doctor’s clinical competence, as well as the depth of their professionalism, 
including perhaps most importantly, how adept they are at minimising injury to 
patients should a negative event occur (Chamberlain 2012).  
However, these changes could be undermined by what Shepperd et al (2015) refer 
to as ‘optimism bias’. This concept refers to situations where the high probability 
of positive outcomes is given more weight than the relatively low probability of 
harmful outcomes, even though such outcomes may have devastating 
consequences. Indeed, instead of reassuring members of the public, ongoing 
regulatory reforms, such as the introduction of medical revalidation, arguably run 
the risk of unrealistically increasing the ‘risk optimism’ of members of public so 
that they develop the view that negative events are so unlikely to occur that it is 
unnecessary to worry about them and that current protection measure will ensure 
no harm occurs (Rudisill 2013). Given the claims that  recent reforms of  medical 
regulation in the UK will enhance patient safety, it is certainly likely that if and 
when individuals experience harm, they will blame those involved in the system 
for failing to protect them and creating a false sense of security even when harm 
involved was essentially unpreventable, an ‘accident’. After all, within today’s 
risk-adverse socio-political climate, it is possible to argue that there is a human 
factor in every event so ‘accidents’ in the sense of random natural unpreventable 
events no longer exist.  This means that any chance of clinical underperformance 
should be identified and addressed via the revalidation process overseen by the 
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royal colleges and the GMC and more punitive measures against practitioners are 
required justified when harmful  events occur. 
There is already some evidence of this type of reaction in the public response to 
high profile medical malpractice and negligence cases, such as mid-Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust. The initial media reporting of events in the Trust, as well as 
the subsequent Francis inquiry (Francis 2013) documented the sense of shock and 
betrayal of the patients and their families.  There was a very palpable public sense 
that the suffering of the patients experienced as the result of poor care could and 
should have been prevented by those in authority, including those responsible for 
identifying and managing potentially ‘risky doctors’, such as the General Medical 
Council. Given the relatively recent introduction of medical revalidation and 
reforms to the complaint and tribunal process, it not possible at this stage to 
ascertain if recent developments in medical regulation in the UK will in time lead 
to patients further overestimating the effectiveness of the protective systems 
designed to promote public safety. But it is possible to argue that the failure of 
the reforming agenda to expand the diversity of public involvement in regulatory 
processes, could well exacerbate the situation. Particularly in the context of 
ongoing reforms to the complaint and medical tribunal process. In no small part 
due to the highly charged and emotional nature of the cases the complaint and 
tribunal system deals with.  
There is the possibility  that, instead of making the public more confident in 
medical regulatory reform when negative events occur, recent regulatory 
developments might instead lead to patients and their families possessing an 
unrealistic ‘optimism bias’ expectation that their complaints will automatically 
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lead to disciplinary action being taken against a doctor through a medical tribunal. 
Therefore, if reformers want the regulatory system to be more ‘legitimate’, that is 
enhance public support for and confidence in the health care system, then those 
responsible for the institutions which manage risk, for example the  General 
Medical Council, need to create a more realistic public expectation of what is 
possible, and to demonstrate that swift and effective action is taken if and when 
the individual or groups of practitioners do not have the skills and competence to 
prevent harm to their patients.  Such legitimacy would be enhanced if there were 
broader and more representative public participation in regulatory processes 
(Chamberlain 2015). At the very least, as I discuss in the next section of this 
paper, attempts to recalibrate public perceptions of medical risk and communicate 
more effectively what can be realistically done to minimise it, alongside what can 
and should be done to punish individuals who fail to effectively manage the risk of 
harm to others, requires the broadening of current conceptions surrounding public 
involvement within public service regulatory regimes, of which healthcare is one 
example.  
Discussion: challenging the regulatory logic 
The recent Law Commission review of the General Medical Council argued that the 
complaint and medical tribunal process is a vitally important legal mechanism for 
ensuring patient safety and public trust in medical regulation (Law Commission 
2014a, Law Commission 2014b, Law Commission 2014c). In the past, failings in the 
UK regulatory system were blamed on the medical profession and its apparent 
refusal to modernise (see Saks 2014). Some commentators have even gone so far as 
to suggest there was a need to replace the General Medical Council with a new 
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regulatory body (for example, see Gladstone 2000, McCartney 2014). Although I 
have argued in this article that there are continuing grounds to be concerned 
about the ways in which the General Medical Council operates, it is nonetheless 
important to remain analytical, not overly normative, and to critically scrutinise 
the assumptions which underlie regulatory reform and their implications for wider 
society. In this regard, I have focused on how state-initiated reform to the General 
Medical Council and the complaint process over the last decade has led to a 
growing perception within the medical profession that it is far less tolerant of 
infractions than previously.  
I have provided evidence that the General Medical Council is adopting a more 
hard-line approach and that this has implications for the physical and mental 
health of doctors under investigation  (see Moberly 2014, Bourne 2015). I noted 
that the death of 96 doctors facing a fitness to practice investigation between 
2004 and 2015 is a serious cause for concern (Chamberlain 2012).  I have also 
argued, however, that there is evidence that the General Medical Council’s 
gatekeeper role in investigating complaints remains highly contentious. For 
example, in spite of an increase in the number of complaints and two decades of 
reform to the General Medical Council, the proportion taken forward for 
investigation remained relatively static at between 75% and 80% per annum, nor 
has there been a statistically significant rise in the number of doctors struck off 
the medical register (Chamberlain 2015). This is significant as it appears, 
therefore, that legislative reforms designed to increase the ability of the General 
Medical Council to take action against incompetent doctors, have not achieved 
their intended goals, and indeed, run the risk of endangering already vulnerable 
patients further (Archer 2014). As a result, current moves to strengthen further 
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the investigatory and adjudication process, by legislating to ensure that the 
Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service is a more autonomous entity within the 
General Medical Council, appear problematic. I have argued that the current 
reforms, no matter how well intentioned, do not address the central concern that 
rather than reflecting the nature of the society whose interests they are charged 
to protect, both the General Medical Council and the Medical Practitioner Tribunal 
Service currently appear to fail in their institutional processes to fully account for 
the diverse nature of the complainant profile and to reflect the broader 
demographic composition of contemporary British society.  
I have noted that there limits to the analysis in this article.  In particular, there is 
limited information on this topic given historical access problems. While the still 
unfolding nature of the regulatory reform agenda means that considerable further 
empirical data must be collected over time before any firm conclusions can be 
drawn. It does not necessarily follow that improving the diversity of patient 
involvement in healthcare quality assurance and regulatory processes will lead to 
an increased level of public satisfaction (Dent and Pahor 2015). This is particularly 
true when dealing with tribunal processes which frequently deal with highly 
complex and emotionally charged cases (Chamberlain 2015). Nonetheless, greater 
diversity of patient involvement in regulatory and tribunal processes is arguably a 
necessity given the need for accountable and representative forms of public sector 
governance within democratic societies (Gibbs 2015). Furthermore, as discussed 
earlier in this paper, managerialism plays a key role within contemporary risk-
based regulatory processes for expert and professional groups, where there is 
strong central control is strongly exerted (Dent 2015). The danger here is that 
adopting such administrative approaches to NHS service delivery without adequate 
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representative public involvement to counteract practices involving collusion 
between doctors and NHS management, could undermine or subvert the focus of 
the regulatory reform agenda on promoting service quality and safety, in a manner 
not too dissimilar to what has happened in repeated high profile medical 
malpractice cases reported in the media since the early 1980s (Saks 2015). 
Furthermore, confidence in these systems may be undermined by risk optimism 
biases, so that evidence of failure creates shock and anger.  To avoid such 
reactions those involved need to develop more inclusive risk management 
approaches if medical regulatory systems are to communicate more realistic 
perceptions of medical risk to service users (Chapin and Coleman 2009).   
Ferlie et al (2012) discuss how the increasing role of risk-based managerialist forms 
of governance in the field of cancer service management in the UK bring with them 
the possibly that medical systems and quality assurance processes may increasingly 
pay lip service to the notion of greater user involvement, but in reality concern 
themselves primarily with matters of economic efficiency and cost containment. 
Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter (2008) suggest that under contemporary neoliberal 
mentalities of rule, risk-based regulatory approaches to health service delivery 
possess the potential to conflate the aim of risk identification and management 
with more effective cost management, rather than the promotion of an 
operational culture which first and foremost acts to protect service-users from 
harm. In this article, I have contributed to this discussion by highlighting the ways 
in which the current regulatory reform agenda is operating with a restricted 
conception of the patient experience and participation in relation to complaint 
and tribunal processes when a doctor’s fitness to practise is called into question. A 
similar conclusion was drawn by the recent Francis inquiry. It argued for the need 
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to include more non-medical members within complaint management processes, in 
an effort to ensure greater transparency and accountability within professional and 
administrative dominated NHS operational systems, as these have in the past acted 
to subvert employment processes designed to support whistleblowing when 
problems occur (Francis 2013). 
Conclusion 
 A key implication of my analysis is its potential relevance to international 
jurisdictions, in terms of the need to increase the diversity of user-involvement in 
regulatory processes. Significant variation exists in how health care systems and 
the performance of medical work are regulated in Europe, the US and Australasia. 
Nonetheless, as in the UK, these countries are undergoing an intensive period of 
health care reform, and furthermore, they arguably share the same underpinning 
regulatory logic, at least in terms of rhetorically emphasising the value of the 
participation of non-medical groups and patients for ensuring the more effective 
management of health care costs and risks (for example, see de Vries et al 2009, 
Giarelli 2014, and Risso-Gill 2014). Yet in the pan-European, US and Australasian 
contexts, McDonald (2012), Chadderton et al (2013), Beaupert et al (2014), 
Bismark et al 2015 and Saks (2015), have all suggested that patient involvement in 
regulatory regimes tends to be limited to particular elite interest groups, rather 
than reflecting the broad social strata of these diverse societies. This point was 
echoed by Bouwman et al (2015), who concluded after reviewing the Dutch 
regulatory system that enhanced practitioner accountability and improvement in 
the detection of problems in health care will only emerge when a long-term 
learning commitment is made, on behalf of government and professional groups, to 
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promote more expansive and inclusive public participation mechanisms. The 
developments I have outlined and examined in this article tend to support this 
conclusion. We must begin to collectively act to challenge misconceptions 
surrounding what the diverse backgrounds and needs of health service users really 
are. If only so the all too often restrictive and exclusory neoliberal regulatory logic 
that tends to dominate the design of contemporary forms of risk-governance can 
be transformed for the greater benefit of all. 
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